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NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS AND THE EQUITY 
CONFLICT: APPLYING BAKER V. GENERAL MOTORS 
THROUGH THE LENS OF HISTORY 
Scott Hovanyetz∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
If a state court issues an injunction against an employee order-
ing him not to violate a non-competition agreement (“non-
compete”), must a court in another state give Full Faith and Credit1 
to that order?  What if enforcing the non-compete violates the state’s 
law?  In Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic Inc.,2 the Supreme Court 
of California considered a case in which two trial courts⎯one in Cali-
fornia, the other in Minnesota⎯issued conflicting temporary re-
straining orders in a non-compete dispute in which the parties liti-
gated simultaneously in both states.3  The Supreme Court of 
California resolved the conflict using principles of comity,4 but this 
option is not available to every state court. 
Georgia courts, for example, are bound by state law that forbids 
the recognition of foreign judgments under principles of comity if 
doing so would violate state public policy.5  Since Georgia public pol-
icy weighs against enforcement of non-competes,6 recognizing a for-
eign judgment upholding such an agreement under comity may not 
be an option for Georgia courts.  Perhaps recognizing the potential 
for inter-jurisdictional conflict, the United States Court of Appeals for 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.J. in Journalism, 
1996, University of Missouri.  I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Charles Sul-
livan, for providing invaluable guidance and insightful editing through the drafting 
of this comment. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the 
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.  And the Congress 
may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”). 
 2 59 P.3d 231 (Cal. 2002). 
 3 Id. at 232−35. 
 4 Id. at 237. 
 5 GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-9 (2006). 
 6 Id. § 13-8-2. 
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the Eleventh Circuit in Keener v. Convergys Corp.7 amended an order 
issued by a district court that, applying Georgia law, forbade an em-
ployer from enforcing a non-compete anywhere in the nation.8  The 
court held that the order should have effect only in Georgia.9  Can 
this decision be rationalized with the Supreme Court of the United 
States’ ruling in Baker v. General Motors Corp.,10 where the majority 
held that equitable judgments are not outside the reach of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause,11 but that some equitable orders can be de-
nied Full Faith and Credit when they purport “to accomplish an offi-
cial act within the exclusive province” of a state?12
This Comment will argue that, under Baker, decisions on the en-
forcement of out-of-state judgments in non-compete disputes lie out-
side the reach of Full Faith and Credit.  Full Faith and Credit governs 
only relations between the states.13  While foreign judgments are con-
clusive as to the merits of a claim, a state court’s decision as to the 
appropriate remedy for that claim is not binding on foreign state 
courts.14  Such decisions are within the “exclusive province” of states, 
as defined by the majority decision in Baker.15
Applied in the context of non-competes, this proposition leads 
to the conclusion that, while a state court may not reconsider the 
merits of a foreign court judgment on whether a non-compete has 
been violated, it may decide that the lex fori bars it from applying an 
injunctive remedy ordered by the foreign court. 
This Comment begins in Part II with a discussion of the essence 
of conflict between the Full Faith and Credit Clause and equitable 
remedies.  It analyzes two recent cases where these problems have 
manifested in the context of non-competes.  Part III next examines 
Baker v. General Motors Corp., the latest and most relevant precedent 
from the Supreme Court of the United States on the issue.  It then 
looks to the case law that forms the bedrock of Full Faith and Credit 
 7 342 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 8 Id. at 1269. 
 9 Id. 
 10 522 U.S. 222 (1998). 
 11 Id. at 234. 
 12 Id. at 235. 
 13 See M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 325 (1839).  The object of Full Faith and 
Credit was to “produce such intimate relations between the states” so that they would 
not be as foreign sovereigns with respect to one another, and to provide certainty in 
the effect of judgments obtained in other states.  Id. 
 14 See id. at 326 (noting that when making a determination as to “a plea to the 
remedy . . . the lex fori must prevail”). 
 15 See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235. 
HOVANYETZ_FINAL_V2 1/7/2008  6:35:56 PM 
2008] COMMENT 255 
 
jurisprudence for help in interpreting Baker, and discusses the ques-
tions that Baker left unanswered.  It also explores how state sover-
eignty concerns pose the greatest stumbling blocks in resolving the 
conflict between Full Faith and Credit and equitable judgments.  Part 
IV lays out the known boundaries of Full Faith and Credit, showing 
how the cases establish the circumstances in which Full Faith and 
Credit applies and when it does not.  Part V argues that this case his-
tory suggests that equitable remedies awarded in non-compete cases 
lie beyond the reach of Full Faith and Credit.  Finally, Part VI pro-
poses liquidated damage clauses in non-competes as an effective al-
ternative to equitable relief. 
II. PROBLEMS ARISING WHEN FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IS APPLIED TO 
EQUITABLE REMEDIES IN NON-COMPETE CASES 
A. “The Equity Conflict” 
Equity conflict is a term coined by Professor Polly J. Price to de-
scribe “problems that arise when state courts issue equitable decrees 
that are intended to have extraterritorial effect.”16  When a state court 
issues an injunction with extraterritorial effect, the application of Full 
Faith and Credit creates concerns about a state extending its power 
beyond its own territorial boundaries.17
In her paper, Professor Price poses a hypothetical scenario in 
which the equity conflict arises in the context of a non-compete: an 
employee in Michigan who has signed a non-compete leaves his job, 
moves to Missouri, and takes a job with a competitor there.18  The 
former employer’s success in enforcing a non-compete might differ 
depending on whether: (a) the employer sues to enforce the non-
compete in Missouri state court, which could rule that the agreement 
violates the state’s public policy; or (b) the employer sues in Michi-
gan, obtains an injunction against the ex-employee there, and then 
sues to enforce the judgment in Missouri, invoking Full Faith and 
Credit.19
 16 Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 748 
(1998). 
 17 Id. at 753. 
 18 Id. at 835−36. 
 19 Id. at 836. 
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B. Recent Examples of the Equity Conflict in Non-Compete Disputes 
While states vary in the degree to which they permit non-
competes to be enforced, two states⎯California and Georgia⎯take 
an extreme approach and reject almost all enforcement.20  Georgia’s 
public policy stems from a state constitutional provision prohibiting 
the Georgia General Assembly from authorizing contracts that inhibit 
competition.21  California’s policy stems from a statute voiding con-
tracts that restrain anyone “from engaging in a lawful profession, 
trade, or business of any kind.”22
Employers seeking to avoid these state policies to enforce non-
competes are likely to craft choice-of-law clauses in the agreements to 
obtain favorable law; conversely, employees seeking to escape non-
competes are likely to seek declaratory relief in a state that is unlikely 
to uphold non-competes.23  The effect of Full Faith and Credit on 
such disputes is that the litigant who obtains judgment first, wins; if a 
litigant succeeds in being the first to obtain judgment upholding or 
nullifying a non-compete in one state court, then that judgment is 
binding on all other states.24  As a result, non-compete litigation in 
many cases has been a race to the courthouse, or “race to judgment,” 
in which speed and procedural maneuvers become more important 
than the facts of the case.25
Thus, one question arising from the equity conflict concerns the 
reach of Full Faith and Credit: to what extent Full Faith and Credit 
enables states to export their public policies.26  In addition, the con-
flict has generated questions of comity: should a court stay out of 
non-compete litigation brought in its own state when action on the 
same non-compete already has been commenced in another state?27 
Two recent decisions demonstrate the difficulty courts continue to 
experience in dealing with this problem. 
In Medtronic, the employee, Stultz, had signed a non-compete 
with his employer, Medtronic, a Minnesota technology firm, in 1995, 
but in 2000 left the company to work for a California-based competi-
 20 Christopher D. David, When a Promise Is Not a Promise: Georgia’s Law on Non-
Compete Agreements, as Interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit in Keener v. Convergys Corpora-
tion, Gives Rise to Comity and Federalism Concerns, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 395, 396 (2004). 
 21 GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. V(c). 
 22 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2006). 
 23 David, supra note 20, at 406−07. 
 24 See Price, supra note 16, at 835−36. 
 25 David, supra note 20, at 407−08. 
 26 Price, supra note 16, at 753. 
 27 See, e.g., Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic Inc., 59 P.3d 231, 233 (Cal. 
2002). 
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tor, Advanced Bionics.28  Advanced Bionics and Stultz filed for de-
claratory relief in California, seeking to void the non-compete, and 
applied for a temporary restraining order (TRO) forbidding Med-
tronic from seeking relief in Minnesota.29  The California court de-
layed ruling on the TRO application for a day despite Advanced Bi-
onics’ argument that Medtronic would use the time to file an action 
in Minnesota.30  Medtronic immediately removed the California ac-
tion to federal court, thus delaying the hearing on the TRO; it then 
filed a second action in Minnesota seeking an injunction to prevent 
the employee from working on a competing product for Advanced 
Bionics.31  The Minnesota court issued a TRO against Advanced Bion-
ics and Stultz, barring them from pursuing further relief in any other 
court that would interfere with the Minnesota court’s determination 
of the case.32
Back in California, the federal court remanded the case to the 
California state court.33  Thereafter, the Minnesota court replaced the 
TRO with a preliminary injunction, but apparently neglected to in-
clude language in the injunction prohibiting Advanced Bionics and 
Stultz from pursuing relief in the California case.34  Advanced Bionics 
and Stultz then used the opportunity to obtain a TRO from the Cali-
fornia court barring Medtronic from pursuing its case in Minnesota.35  
Subsequently, the Minnesota court amended the preliminary injunc-
tion and added language to order Advanced Bionics and Stultz to 
seek an order vacating the California TRO.36  They did so, but the 
California court refused.37  Medtronic then filed an interlocutory ap-
peal in California.38  The California Court of Appeal upheld the 
TRO, and Medtronic appealed to the Supreme Court of California.39
The Supreme Court of California observed that “judicial re-
straint takes on a more fundamental importance” when cases involve 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 233−34.  Medtronic was aware that Stultz was still a resident of Minnesota 
and that complete diversity did not exist.  Id. at 234. 
 32 Medtronic, 59 P.3d at 234. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 235. 
 38 Medtronic, 59 P.3d at 235.  Medtronic filed the appeal after a failed round of 
negotiations, for which the California court temporarily lifted its TRO.  Id.   
 39 Id. 
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courts of different states, and that showing respect to a sister court 
was more important than avoiding an “‘embarrassing race to judg-
ment.’”40  Despite the state’s strong policy against enforcing non-
competes, the Supreme Court of California held that the policy did 
not outweigh the need to show respect toward the Minnesota pro-
ceeding.41  “A parallel action in a different state presents sovereignty 
concerns that compel California courts to use judicial restraint when 
determining whether they may properly issue a TRO against parties 
pursuing an action in a foreign jurisdiction.”42  Based on principles of 
comity, the California court overturned the TRO and permitted Med-
tronic to continue seeking relief in Minnesota: 
[T]he laws of a state have no force, proprio vigore, beyond its terri-
torial limits, but the laws of one state are frequently permitted by 
the courtesy of another to operate in the latter for the promotion 
of justice, where neither that state nor its citizens will suffer any 
inconvenience from the application of the foreign law.43
Thus, in Medtronic, the Supreme Court of California avoided any 
Full Faith and Credit issue by limiting its holding to overturning the 
anti-suit TRO barring Medtronic from pursuing relief in its preferred 
forum of Minnesota.44  As one concurring justice noted, the Medtronic 
decision leaves lower courts with limited guidance in dealing with 
similar issues in the future.45  The key question⎯whether a court can 
ever force a court in another state to act contrary to its public policy 
in either enforcing or declining to enforce a non-compete⎯remains 
unresolved.46
Medtronic involved a scenario where the employer beat the em-
ployee in the race to the courthouse, but when the reverse oc-
curs⎯when the employee wins the race⎯courts face equally difficult 
decisions.  In Keener v. Convergys Corp.,47 the employee had worked for 
Convergys in Ohio, and signed a non-compete in 1995 in exchange 
 40 Id. at 236 (quoting Auerbach v. Frank, 685 A.2d 404, 407 (D.C. 1996)). 
 41 Id. at 237. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. (quoting In re Estate of Lund, 159 P.2d 643, 653 (Cal. 1945)). 
 44 See Medtronic, 59 P.3d. at 238.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Brown argues 
that the court should have denied the TRO based on California’s obligation to give 
Full Faith and Credit to Minnesota law, and complains that people might use Cali-
fornia as a safe haven to “walk away from valid contractual obligations” simply by re-
locating to the state.  Id. at 239 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 45 Id. at 238 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 46 The conclusion of the majority opinion in Medtronic makes clear that the liti-
gants are free to continue pursuing the action in California until evidence is pre-
sented that a Minnesota court has issued a decision that is binding on California.  Id. 
 47 312 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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for stock options.48  The employee left Convergys for a Georgia-based 
competitor in 2001, but was not forthcoming with Convergys about 
where he was going.49  After a chance meeting with one of his former 
co-workers, the employee received a message from Convergys’s legal 
department reminding him of his obligations under the non-
compete.50  The employee separated from his new employer and 
then, together with the new employer, sought declaratory relief in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia,51 
which granted summary judgment to the employee.52
Convergys appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of 
Georgia on the issue of which state’s law should be applied.53  The 
court answered that it would apply Georgia law.54  Upon the return of 
the case to the Eleventh Circuit, the Court of Appeals had to consider 
the breadth of the district court’s injunction, which prohibited Con-
vergys from litigating the non-compete “in any court worldwide.”55
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion by failing to tailor its ruling more 
narrowly so that the injunction would have effect only in Georgia.56  
The court stated that “Georgia cannot in effect impute its public pol-
icy decisions nationwide—the public policy of Georgia is not that eve-
rywhere.”57  Such a broad permanent injunction would interfere with 
the “parties’ ability to contract and their ability to enforce appropri-
ately derived expectations.”58  The district court’s error was that its in-
junction went “beyond a reasonable scope” in applying Georgia’s 
public policy nationwide.59
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Keener leaves numerous ques-
tions unanswered.  Perhaps the most glaring is why the reach of any 
judgment should be limited by a “reasonable” standard.  The Keener 
decision is confusing because it implies that a court can⎯and in fact 
must⎯“waive” Full Faith and Credit in cases where issuing an equita-
 48 Id. at 1238. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 1238−39. 
 51 Id. at 1239. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Keener, 312 F.3d at 1241. 
 54 Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84 (Ga. 2003). 
 55 Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 1270. 
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ble decree might export the public policy of the forum state to all sis-
ter states. 
III. BAKER V. GENERAL MOTORS: THE LAST WORD  
ON THE EQUITY CONFLICT 
A. Facts and Reasoning of Baker 
The intent of the Framers as to the application of Full Faith and 
Credit to equity is unclear.60  Scholarship suggests that the Framers 
intended Full Faith and Credit mainly to ensure that judgments on 
debts in one state could be collected in every state.61  While it is well 
established that Full Faith and Credit applies to money judgments,62 
the application of Full Faith and Credit to equitable decrees remains 
an open question.63  The most recent decision from the Supreme 
Court of the United States addressing the issue is Baker v. General Mo-
tors Corp.64
Baker concerned a former General Motors (GM) employee, El-
well, who had settled a wrongful discharge suit against GM in a 
Michigan state court.65  As part of the settlement, Elwell stipulated 
that he would not testify as an expert witness against GM in any ac-
tion filed against GM in the future.66  When the Baker plaintiffs later 
filed a wrongful death suit against GM in Missouri state court, GM 
removed the case to federal district court.67  The plaintiffs then 
sought to depose Elwell, and GM objected based on the stipulated 
agreement in Michigan that enjoined Elwell from testifying.68
The district court permitted the Bakers to depose Elwell, on the 
grounds that: (a) refusing to allow Elwell to testify violated Missouri’s 
public policy; and (b) presented with the same circumstances, the 
Michigan court would have modified the injunction.69  Therefore, the 
 60 Price, supra note 16, at 818. 
 61 Id. at 824. 
 62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 100 (1971). 
 63 See id. § 102(c) (“The Supreme Court of the United States has not had occa-
sion to determine whether full faith and credit requires a State of the United States 
to enforce a valid judgment of a sister State that orders the doing of an act other 
than the payment of money or that enjoins the doing of an act.”). 
 64 522 U.S. 222 (1998). 
 65 Id. at 226−28. 
 66 Id. at 228. 
 67 Id. at 229.  The plaintiffs in Baker were Kenneth and Stephen Baker, the sons of 
a woman who died while a passenger in a GM vehicle.  Id. 
 68 Id. at 229−30. 
 69 Baker, 522 U.S. at 230. 
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Missouri court could modify the injunction as well.70  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that 
the Michigan injunction against Elwell should have been given Full 
Faith and Credit, such that only the Michigan court could modify it.71  
The Bakers petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.72
The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously re-
versed.73  Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg confirmed that 
Full Faith and Credit makes a court’s judgment in any state res judi-
cata for all sister states.74  Furthermore, the majority opinion rejected 
a “public policy exception” to Full Faith and Credit.75  Justice Gins-
burg stated that equity decrees are not “outside the full faith and 
credit domain,” and that the preclusive effects of a final judgment do 
not change based on “the type of relief sought in a civil action.”76
To this point, the opinion reads as though General Motors 
would prevail.  However, citing M’Elmoyle and Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws, section 99, Justice Ginsburg wrote that Full Faith and 
Credit “does not mean that States must adopt the practices of other 
States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing 
judgments,” and that “[e]nforcement measures do not travel with the 
sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain 
subject to the even-handed control of forum law.”77  Justice Ginsburg 
recognized that orders “commanding action or inaction” had been 
denied Full Faith and Credit “when they purported to accomplish an 
official act within the exclusive province of that other State or inter-
fered with litigation over which the ordering State had no author-
ity.”78
The majority found the agreement to be preclusive as to claims 
between Elwell and GM, so that Elwell could not sue to recover more 
from GM on the wrongful discharge claim.79  However, issue preclu-
sion could not be exercised against a non-party to the prior adjudica-
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 230−31. 
 72 Id. at 231. 
 73 Price, supra note 16, at 764. 
 74 Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 (“For claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes, 
in other words, the judgment of the rendering State gains nationwide force.”) (foot-
note omitted). 
 75 Id. (“[O]ur decisions support no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full 
faith and credit due judgments.”). 
 76 Id. at 234. 
 77 Id. at 235. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 237−38. 
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tion; the Michigan judgment could not “reach beyond the Elwell-GM 
controversy to control proceedings against GM brought in other 
States, by other parties, asserting claims the merits of which Michigan 
has not considered.”80  The Michigan court could not preclude a Mis-
souri court from determining which witnesses to allow in a com-
pletely unrelated action.81  The “mechanisms for enforcing a judg-
ment” do not travel to a sister state under Full Faith and Credit; 
neither could the Michigan decree operate to determine what evi-
dence could be brought in an unrelated suit.82  The majority opinion 
concluded that: 
Michigan has no authority to shield a witness from another juris-
diction’s subpoena power in a case involving persons and causes 
outside Michigan’s governance.  Recognition, under full faith and 
credit, is owed to dispositions Michigan has authority to order.  
But a Michigan decree cannot command obedience elsewhere on 
a matter the Michigan court lacks authority to resolve.83
In other words, Full Faith and Credit need not be extended to de-
terminations a court lacks the power to make.84
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority 
for unnecessarily extending its analysis when the issue could be re-
solved using basic Full Faith and Credit principles.85  Because preclu-
sive effects never extend to parties who were not parties to the origi-
nal action, the Michigan court would not have extended the Elwell-
GM settlement agreement to the Bakers.86  Therefore, under well-
settled law, Full Faith and Credit did not require courts of the United 
States to apply a Michigan decree in a manner that Michigan itself 
would not.87  In Justice Kennedy’s view, the majority opinion created 
exceptions to Full Faith and Credit that had the potential “for dis-
rupting judgments, and this ought to give us considerable pause.”88
B. The History and Case Law Behind Baker 
Although Baker did not involve a non-compete, it is not hard to 
imagine a scenario in which a court might have to apply the rule laid 
 80 Baker, 522 U.S. at 238. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 239. 
 83 Id. at 240−41. 
 84 Id. at 241 (citing Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 282−83 
(1980)). 
 85 Id. at 243 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 86 Baker, 522 U.S. at 247−48. 
 87 Id. at 247. 
 88 Id. at 244. 
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down in Baker to a non-compete dispute.89  The difficulty, however, is 
determining exactly what Baker means, and how the case might be 
applied in the context of a non-compete.  Professor Price uses a his-
torical approach to help explain the equity conflict and Baker.90  Simi-
larly, it is useful at this point to examine the history and case law be-
hind the Baker decision to help predict what a court applying the rule 
of Baker to a non-compete dispute might decide. 
Equity courts have claimed authority to issue orders with extra-
territorial effect as far back as the English Courts of Chancery.91  
While the Chancery asserted no authority to impose its will on a for-
eign sovereign or direct the outcome of a suit in a foreign court, it 
could indirectly impose an outcome by asserting its authority over the 
litigants.92  The Chancery could use its in personam power to compel 
a litigant to act or refrain from acting, even though the litigant might 
reside or have property outside the bounds of the Chancery’s juris-
diction.93
In the 1839 case of M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that a judgment issued by a state court “does not 
carry with it, into another state, the efficacy of a judgment upon 
property or persons, to be enforced by execution.”94  In this case, a 
plaintiff obtained a judgment on a debt in South Carolina and filed a 
suit in Georgia to collect on that judgment.95  However, Georgia law 
at the time placed a five-year statute of limitations on suits filed to en-
force foreign judgments, and the statutory period had already ex-
pired96  The Court held that the defendant could plead this statute of 
limitations to defend against a suit enforcing a foreign judgment.97  
Thus, the Court held that Full Faith and Credit rendered the judg-
ment of a court in a sister state conclusive, but only as to the merits.98  
To execute a judgment issued in a court of one state upon persons or 
property in a sister state, the judgment “must be made a judgment 
there.”99  Significantly, such judgments “can only be executed in the 
 89 Professor Price hypothesizes such a scenario.  Price, supra note 16, at 835. 
 90 Id. at 750. 
 91 Id. at 802. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 325 (1839). 
 95 Id. at 312. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 328. 
 98 Id. at 324. 
 99 Id. at 325. 
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latter as its laws may permit.”100  The Court in M’Elmoyle observed that 
nothing in the Constitution prohibits states from passing legislation 
to control “the remedy in suits upon the judgments of other states, 
exclusive of all interference with their merits.”101
Thus, at least at this early stage, the Court apparently perceived 
limits to Full Faith and Credit.  The Court’s view of Full Faith and 
Credit in M’Elmoyle was twofold: (1) a state court’s determination as 
to the merits of a cause of action was conclusive as res judicata in all 
states; (2) a sister state could control how the remedy flowing from 
that determination should be administered, at least as far as it could 
place a statute of limitations on the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments.102  Thus, to execute a judgment on a defendant’s person or 
property located in a sister state, the plaintiff had to file suit there.103 
Furthermore, this suit was more than a mere formality in which the 
sister state rubber-stamps the originating court’s determination as to 
the appropriate remedy.104
In Pennoyer v. Neff,105 the Supreme Court of the United States fa-
mously established that, despite the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
money judgments rendered in other states were subject to collateral 
attack where the issuing state lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.106  Nevertheless, in that same case, the Court in dicta af-
firmed the capacity of state courts to issue rulings with extraterritorial 
effect.107  With respect to limits on the reach of state law, the Court 
asserted that “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority 
over persons or property without its territory.”108  The laws of each 
state had no effect outside the boundaries of the state except as was 
allowed by principles of comity, and no state court could “extend its 
process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or prop-
erty to its decisions.”109  At the same time, however, the Court ac-
 100 M’Elmoyle, 38 U.S. at 325. 
 101 Id. at 328. 
 102 Id. at 328 (“[T]he effect intended to be given under our Constitution to judg-
ments is that they are conclusive only as regards the merits; the common law princi-
ple, then, applies to suits upon them, that they must be brought within the period 
prescribed by the local law, the lex fori, or the suit will be barred.”). 
 103 Id. at 325 (“[T]he judgment of a State court cannot be enforced out of the 
State by an execution issued within it.”). 
 104 Id. (“[J]udgments out of the state in which they are rendered are only evidence 
in a sister state that the subject matter of the suit has become a debt of record . . . .”). 
 105 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
 106 Id. at 734. 
 107 Id. at 722−23. 
 108 Id. at 722. 
 109 Id. 
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knowledged that, because “contracts made in one State may be en-
forceable only in another State, and property may be held by non-
residents,” the exercise of power by courts over people and property 
within their territory often would affect people and property outside 
their territory.110  Thus, while any effort by a state court to directly ex-
ert power over people and property outside its territory would “be re-
sisted as usurpation,” “no objection can be justly taken” to a state 
court indirectly exerting such power.111  For example, a state court 
could order a person domiciled within the state to execute a transfer 
of title to property located outside the state.112
This view of the limited nature of equitable jurisdiction played 
out in Fall v. Eastin,113 where a husband and wife jointly purchased 
property in Nebraska and subsequently moved to Washington.114  The 
husband then sued the wife for divorce, and the wife sought a ruling 
from the Washington court awarding her the Nebraska property, 
which the Washington court granted.115  The wife then sued in Ne-
braska to quiet title to the property, which she claimed the husband 
had tried to deny her by transferring it to another.116  The question 
became whether the Federal Constitution required the Nebraska 
court to give Full Faith and Credit to the Washington court’s de-
cree.117  The Court held that the Constitution placed no such re-
quirement on the Nebraska court.118  The Court stated that it was 
“firmly established” that a court in one state could not affect property 
outside its jurisdiction by decree.119  Full Faith and Credit “does not 
extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one State to property situated 
in another,” but instead “only makes the judgment rendered conclu-
sive on the merits of the claim or subject-matter of the suit.”120
While there are limits to Full Faith and Credit, the Court has 
found in numerous cases that Full Faith and Credit mandated an 
outcome.  In Fauntleroy v. Lum,121 the defendant incurred a debt in 
 110 Id. at 723. 
 111 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723. 
 112 Id. 
 113 215 U.S. 1 (1909). 
 114 Id. at 2. 
 115 Id. at 2−3. 
 116 Id. at 4. 
 117 Id. at 4−5. 
 118 Id. at 11. 
 119 Fall, 215 U.S. at 11. 
 120 Id. at 12. 
 121 210 U.S. 230 (1908). 
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cotton futures in Mississippi, but declined to pay.122  The plaintiff 
later found the defendant in Missouri, and obtained a judgment 
there.123  After the Missouri court found for the plaintiff based on 
Mississippi law, the plaintiff sought to execute the Missouri judgment 
in Mississippi.124  However, because Mississippi law in fact made “deal-
ings in futures” illegal, and forbade the courts from enforcing such 
contracts, the Mississippi court refused to enforce the Missouri judg-
ment.125  The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Mis-
souri judgment was “conclusive as to all the media concludendi,” 
even though the Missouri court was in error in its assessment of Mis-
sissippi law.126  The Missouri judgment was subject to challenge only 
for a failure of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, and could not 
be impeached for a mistake of law.127
In Roche v. McDonald,128 the Court reached a decision that, at first 
glance, appears at odds with M’Elmoyle.  In Roche, a plaintiff obtained 
a judgment in Washington, which he assigned to a second plaintiff six 
years later.129  Finding the defendant in Oregon, the second plaintiff 
obtained a second judgment there.130  The second plaintiff then re-
turned to Washington and filed a third suit to enforce the Oregon 
judgment against the defendant.131  However, under Washington law, 
judgments had to be enforced within six years of their rendition, and 
this period had expired by the time the plaintiff filed the Oregon ac-
tion.132  Thus, the Washington court refused to give Full Faith and 
Credit to the Oregon judgment.133  The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton reasoned that the six-year time limit could not be extended by fil-
ing a second suit in a sister state, and that the Oregon court had 
failed to consider the six-year time limit under Washington law.134  
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that 
Washington could not refuse Full Faith and Credit to the Oregon 
 122 Id. at 233. 
 123 Id. at 234. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 237. 
 127 Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237. 
 128 275 U.S. 449 (1928). 
 129 Id. at 450. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 451. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Roche, 275 U.S. at 451. 
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judgment on these grounds.135  Fauntleroy was the controlling case be-
cause the grounds for the Washington court’s refusal to extend Full 
Faith and Credit to the Oregon judgment was that the Oregon court 
committed an error of law.136  The defendant should have raised the 
Washington statute when the case was before the Oregon court; once 
the Oregon court had issued its decision, the opportunity to raise 
that defense had been lost.137
This case history suggests that once a court has made a determi-
nation as to the merits of the case⎯how the law of the case applies to 
the facts⎯that determination cannot be overturned in another state 
simply because the enforcing state would reach a different conclusion 
if it applied its own law.138  Given this strong history, it seems likely 
that once a court has issued a determination as to the validity of a 
non-compete, no court in another state could deny Full Faith and 
Credit to that determination based on the fact that its own law was 
different.139  The remaining question is whether a court, asked to act 
in violation of its own policy in enforcing a determination issued by a 
court in a sister state concerning a non-compete, has any leeway un-
der Full Faith and Credit to chart its own course. 
C. Questions Persist in the Wake of Baker 
One of the frustrating aspects of the majority opinion in Baker is 
that its core holding seems to be that Full Faith and Credit always ap-
plies to equity⎯except when it doesn’t.  Justice Kennedy expressed 
this frustration in his concurring opinion when he observed that “the 
majority, having stated the principle, proceeds to disregard it by an-
nouncing two broad exceptions.”140  The majority’s decision lives “in 
uneasy tension” with its rejection of a public-policy exception to Full 
Faith and Credit, leaving uncertainty in its wake.141  “In the absence of 
more elaboration, it is unclear what it is about the particular injunc-
 135 Id. at 454−55. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 The Supreme Court of the United States has had numerous opportunities to 
reconsider the rule that a judgment of a sister state cannot be questioned on the 
merits⎯even if the judgment is founded on a mistake of law⎯and repeatedly upheld 
it.  See Union Nat’l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 41−42 (1949); Morris v. Jones, 329 
U.S. 545, 550−51 (1947); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940); Titus v. Wal-
lick, 306 U.S. 282, 291 (1939). 
 139 See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (holding that the determina-
tion is “conclusive as to all the media concludendi”) (emphasis added). 
 140 Baker v. Gen. Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 243 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 141 Id. at 245. 
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tion here that renders it undeserving of full faith and credit.”142  Jus-
tice Kennedy’s preferred approach would be not to address the Full 
Faith and Credit issue at all, unless absolutely necessary; even then, 
he would address the question only in a narrow fashion.143
Yet, as Justice Breyer remarked during oral arguments for Baker, 
in 200 years of judicial history, the courts had failed to provide a clear 
articulation of how Full Faith and Credit applies to equitable de-
crees.144  If the Court had adopted Justice Kennedy’s conservative ap-
proach, it might have been another 200 years before the Court ad-
dressed the question.  At worst, the majority opinion in Baker fails to 
bring any more light to the darkness than existed before; at best, it 
provides kernels of guidance that may yet nudge the law toward a 
more definitive resolution to the equity conflict problem. 
As evidenced by the decisions in Medtronic and Keener, numerous 
issues related to the equity conflict remain in the wake of Baker.  In 
Medtronic, the Supreme Court of California decided the issue without 
directly addressing Full Faith and Credit issues,145 so the problem 
would arise again with any out-of-state judgments that could provide a 
basis for an injunction in California.  In Keener, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit struggled to obtain a sub-
stantially fair result while satisfying the requirements of Full Faith and 
Credit.146  One of the sources of the difficulty in Keener was a Georgia 
law that prohibits the state’s courts from extending comity to sister 
states where enforcement of a sister state’s judgment or law would be 
contrary to Georgia public policy or prejudicial to the interests of the 
state.147  Thus, the court in Keener was deprived of a comity “escape 
hatch” that the Supreme Court of California used in Medtronic. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See id. (“We might be required to hold, if some future case raises the issue, that 
an otherwise valid judgment cannot intrude upon essential processes of courts out-
side the issuing state in certain narrow circumstances, but we need not announce or 
define that principle here.”). 
 144 Price, supra note 16, at 751. 
 145 See Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, 59 P.3d 231, 237 (Cal. 2002). 
 146 Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1265, 1269−70 (11th Cir. 2003).  The 
court was clearly unhappy with granting a nationwide injunction to the employee-
plaintiff in the case, given evidence that the employee-plaintiff had deceived his for-
mer employer in an effort to win the “race to the courthouse” and obtain a forum 
with favorable law.  Id. at 1270. 
 147 GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-9 (2006).  Notably, in the Supreme Court of Georgia’s an-
swer to the Eleventh Circuit’s certified question, one judge urged the Georgia legisla-
ture to adopt RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1989), provid-
ing that courts should honor the law of a sister state when parties have chosen that 
sister state to govern their contractual relationship.  Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 
S.E.2d 84, 87−88 (Ga. 2003) (Sears, J., concurring). 
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Georgia’s public policy against enforcing non-competes stems 
from a constitutional mandate barring the Georgia Assembly from 
passing laws that authorize contracts that interfere with competi-
tion.148  Covenants ancillary to employment contracts⎯including 
non-competes⎯receive strict scrutiny and are not “blue-penciled,” 
meaning that if any portion of the agreement fails to pass scrutiny, 
the entire agreement fails.149  To be enforceable in Georgia, a non-
compete must be: reasonable; supported by valuable consideration; 
“reasonably necessary to protect the interest of the party in whose fa-
vor it is imposed”; and must not “unduly prejudice the interests of the 
public.”150  On certification from the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court of Georgia made clear in 
Keener that it would not enforce a choice-of-law clause in a non-
compete contract where application of the chosen law would violate 
state policy and prejudice state interests.151  Based on this stance, it 
seems unlikely that the state would extend comity to another state in 
a non-compete dispute.152  Thus, the court in Keener was forced to 
tackle the equity conflict directly, and sought a way to confine the 
reach of Georgia’s public policy to Georgia.153
D. Sovereignty Concerns Lie at the Heart of the Equity Conflict 
At the heart of the hesitation to apply blanket Full Faith and 
Credit to equitable decrees154 are concerns about state sovereignty, 
which become apparent when considered in the light of controversial 
moral issues that generate animosity among the states.155  For exam-
ple, in the case of Wilson v. Ake,156 the United States District Court for 
 148 GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. V(c) (codified by statute at GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-
2 (2006)). 
 149 Northside Hosp., Inc. v. McCord, 537 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
 150 Id. 
 151  Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84, 85−86 (Ga. 2003). 
 152 See id. 
 153 See Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 154 The American Bar Association Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform 
in 1927 proposed an amendment to the Federal Full Faith and Credit statute that 
would institute blanket Full Faith and Credit for all equitable decrees.  Price, supra 
note 16, at 826−29.  The proposal was put to Congress, and failed to reach a floor 
vote.  Id. 
 155 For example, in the context of the slavery debate, Full Faith and Credit was su-
perseded by the Fugitive Slave Clause.  See Anthony J. Sebok, Note, Judging the Fugitive 
Slave Acts, 100 YALE L. J. 1835, 1847 n.68 (1991).  In a more modern context, Con-
gress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which exempts states from extending Full 
Faith and Credit to same-sex marriage decrees issued by other states.  28 U.S.C. § 
1738C (2006). 
 156 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
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the Middle District of Florida objected to applying Full Faith and 
Credit to an out-of-state same-sex marriage decree on the grounds 
that it violated the public policy of Florida.157  In doing so, the court 
ignored Justice Ginsburg’s clear rejection of a “public policy excep-
tion” to Full Faith and Credit in Baker.158  However, the Wilson court 
summed up concerns about applying Full Faith and Credit to equity 
when it deplored giving any one state a “license . . . to create national 
policy.”159
In the context of non-competes, sovereignty concerns run both 
ways.  If, as the court found in Keener, Georgia should not be allowed 
to export its public policy against non-competes to other states,160 
then neither should Minnesota’s public policy favoring non-competes 
be exported to California or Georgia. 
IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
A. The Known Reach of Full Faith and Credit 
The purpose of Full Faith and Credit was to alter “the status of 
the several states” so that a “remedy upon a just obligation might be 
demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origin.”161  Yet, 
“[t]here are some limitations upon the extent to which a state may be 
required by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judg-
ment of another state in contravention of its own statutes or pol-
icy.”162  Even still, “our decisions support no roving ‘public policy ex-
 157 Id. at 1304. 
 158 Baker v. Gen. Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).  A full discussion of the appli-
cation of Full Faith and Credit in the context of same-sex marriage and other moral 
issues is beyond the scope of this Comment.  However, interestingly, the Wilson 
court’s decision was based on a faulty interpretation of Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 
(1979), and Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).  
Both cases hold that courts need not extend Full Faith and Credit to the laws of 
other states, and thus may consider their own state’s public policy in making choice-
of-law decisions; neither case supports a “public policy exception” to Full Faith and 
Credit.  In Hall, the Court held that the California courts need not apply a Nevada 
sovereign immunity statute in a case where a California citizen sued the state over an 
automobile accident involving a state employee. Hall, 440 U.S. at 421−22.  In Pac. 
Employers Ins. Co., the Court held that California was not required to apply a Massa-
chusetts worker’s compensation law in a case where a Massachusetts employee, who 
was injured while in California, sued to recover in California.  Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 
306 U.S. at 502. 
 159 Wilson, 354 F. Supp. at 1303. 
 160 See Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 161 Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276−77 (1935). 
 162 Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 502. 
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ception’ to the full faith and credit due judgments.”163 With so many 
seemingly contradictory pronouncements, it is worthwhile to develop 
areas where precedent has established that Full Faith and Credit ap-
plies, and in areas where Full Faith and Credit does not reach, to see 
where the enforcement of non-competes might fit. 
First, Full Faith and Credit applies to court determinations as to 
the merits of a claim.  To examine what is meant by a court’s determi-
nation as to the merits of a claim as opposed to its determination of 
the appropriate remedy, it is useful to compare the Roche and M’Elmoyle 
cases.  In both cases, a court issued a judgment, and the plaintiff 
failed to collect on that judgment in a specified amount of time.164  
However, in Roche, enforcement of the sister state’s judgment was de-
nied on the grounds that it would have been void had the action been filed 
originally in the enforcing state.165  Clearly, courts cannot “second-guess” 
other courts in this manner.  As in Fauntleroy, a court cannot decline 
Full Faith and Credit to a sister court’s determination that a contract 
was valid based on the fact that, had it had the opportunity to review 
the facts of the case, the court would have found the same contract to 
be invalid.166  In contrast, M’Elmoyle involved no second-guessing of 
the first court; the Georgia court’s holding in M’Elmoyle was not that 
the South Carolina court had been wrong, but rather that the plain-
tiff had failed to abide by Georgia law regarding the enforcement of 
foreign judgments.167  These cases are a basic expression of the doc-
trine of res judicata that a claim, once determined in one state, can-
not be relitigated in another.168
Second, money judgments in one state are enforceable in all 
states.169  The question might reasonably be raised as to why courts 
should reach opposite results depending on whether the plaintiff 
employer seeks specific enforcement or money damages.  Both com-
pel the defendant to act: in the case of the injunction, to obey the 
agreement; in the case of the money judgment, to pay money. 
The difference in the treatment of legal and equitable remedies 
is rooted in the centuries-old common law distinction between law 
 163 Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. 
 164 See M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312 (1839); see also Roche v. McDonald, 275 
U.S. 449, 451 (1928). 
 165 Roche, 275 U.S. at 451. 
 166 See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234−37 (1908). 
 167 See M’Elmolye, 38 U.S. at 324. 
 168 See id. at 328. 
 169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 100 (1971). 
HOVANYETZ_FINAL_V2 1/7/2008  6:35:56 PM 
272 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:253 
 
and equity courts.170  Although the law and equity courts have long 
since merged in most jurisdictions,171 there remain reasons why legal 
and equitable judgments should be treated differently: the geo-
graphic reach and types of behavior addressed by equitable decrees is 
expanding;172 there is coercion present in equitable judgments, which 
are enforced through contempt, that is not present with money 
judgments;173 and application of Full Faith and Credit to money 
judgments has a stronger and more settled grounding in history and 
precedent.174  Furthermore, unlike legal remedies, the use of equita-
ble remedies has long been considered a matter of discretion for the 
enforcing court, and it is questionable whether a foreign court 
should be allowed to compel the use of that discretion through the 
application of Full Faith and Credit.175  However, perhaps most im-
portantly, the application of Full Faith and Credit to equitable judg-
ments generates “interstate conflict” and raises concerns about state 
sovereignty and federalism that legal judgments generally do not.176
B. The Known Limits of Full Faith and Credit 
Next, it is useful to list the areas in which precedent indicates 
that Full Faith and Credit does not apply.  First, Full Faith and Credit 
does not require a state to apply another state’s law over its own law, 
although this limit is pertinent only to choice-of-law determinations, 
i.e., when a court is deciding which state’s law to apply to a determi-
 170 See Price, supra note 16, at 751−52.  Legal judgments are said to attach to the 
defendant’s property, whereas equitable judgments attach to the person and control 
future action.  Id. 
 171 See id. at 811−17. 
 172 The use of equitable relief has expanded since the nineteenth century, when 
the use of equitable power was generally limited to the protection of property rights, 
circumstances of imminent irreparable harm, and circumstances where legal reme-
dies were found to be inadequate.  Id. at 815−16.  Courts have moved away from 
these traditional limitations.  Id. at 816−17.  In addition, courts today increasingly 
apply equitable relief in cases involving interstate commercial activities, further con-
tributing to the expansion of the use of far-ranging equitable remedies.  Id. at 817. 
 173 See Price, supra note 16, at 752 (“Equitable relief demands obedience of a de-
fendant, but in most cases a court can only obtain compliance with the decree 
through threat of contempt.”). 
 174 Id. at 755−56. 
 175 See id. at 815 (injunctions were “always considered a ‘discretionary remedy’”); 
see also id. at 835 (“The inherent discretion and flexibility of remedial equitable de-
crees . . . increases the likelihood that cases raising Baker-like problems will continue 
to prevent coherent resolution of the equity conflict.”). 
 176 See id. at 835. 
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nation as to the merits of a case, and not whether to enforce a sister 
state’s judgment.177
Justice Ginsburg summarized the remaining areas succinctly in 
her opinion in Baker.178  As established in M’Elmoyle, states need not, 
under Full Faith and Credit, adopt the “time, manner, and mecha-
nisms” other states use for enforcing judgments.179  In addition, Full 
Faith and Credit need not be extended to extraterritorial equitable 
orders that attempt to “accomplish an official act within the exclusive 
province” of another state or interfere “with litigation over which the 
ordering State had no authority.”180  The Baker majority opinion of-
fers several examples, one being that a state court judgment cannot 
be effective to transfer title to land in another state.181  Anti-suit in-
junctions regarding out-of-state litigation have not been effective to 
stop the litigation because they do not address the merits of the case, 
and thus are not given preclusive effect under Full Faith and 
Credit.182  Furthermore, sanctions for violating an injunction are 
“generally administered by the court that issued the injunction.”183 
Finally, the issue directly addressed in Baker presumably can be added 
to this list.184  The question is whether injunctions related to non-
competes are within the category of “acts within the exclusive prov-
ince” of a state, and thus lie beyond the reach of Full Faith and 
Credit.185
V. DECISIONS CONCERNING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF  
NON-COMPETES ARE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF A STATE 
The prospect of awarding specific enforcement to plaintiffs seek-
ing to enforce foreign judgments upholding non-competes would be 
vexing for the courts of California and Georgia because, by the very 
act of granting such an award, these courts would be violating their 
 177 See cases cited supra note 158. 
 178 See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235−36. 
 179 Id. at 235. 
 180 Id.  These are the “two broad exceptions” Justice Kennedy believes the Court 
has created in Baker.  Id. at 243 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 181 Id. at 235 (citing Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909)). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Baker, 522 U.S. at 236.  The Court cites Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F.2d 626, 628 (2d 
Cir. 1963), in which the enforcing court granted the monetary portion of a judgment 
made in a sister state but declined to enforce the injunctive portion.  Id. 
 184 Specifically, Baker establishes that “full faith and credit principles do not com-
pel the state to enforce another state court’s injunction prohibiting unrelated poten-
tial plaintiffs from access to privileged or confidential information.”  Price, supra note 
16, at 768. 
 185  See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235. 
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own state’s public policy and law.  Particularly in the case of Georgia, 
the courts must consider a constitutional command declaring that 
anti-competitive contracts are “unlawful and void.”186  Thus, because 
of Full Faith and Credit, a Georgia court might be required to re-
strain trade when the Georgia Constitution indicates that it may not 
do so. 
A possible solution to the problem would be for the Georgia 
court to determine that it is constitutionally forbidden from restrict-
ing a citizen’s ability to seek employment via an award of specific en-
forcement.  A Georgia court could hold that it lacks the power to 
grant specific enforcement in a way that violates its constitution.  A 
similar, although perhaps less powerful, argument could be made in 
the case of the California courts, where non-competes are void under 
statutory law.187  Although statutes lack the force of a state constitu-
tion, California courts could conclude that an injunction upholding a 
non-compete itself would violate the California code, and thus is be-
yond the court’s power to grant.188
In justifying these conclusions, the Georgia and California courts 
could take the position that their decisions on these issues are within 
the exclusive province of a state, and thus are beyond the reach of 
Full Faith and Credit as described in Baker.  In support of this posi-
tion, these courts could hold that they have a sovereign right to in-
terpret their own constitutions.189  In addition, they could find that 
courts in one state may not directly compel courts in another state to 
take action; thus, Full Faith and Credit should not work to compel 
them to exercise their equitable discretion in a way that creates a con-
flict with their state constitution and law.190
In support of this position, it is important to distinguish Roche 
and Fauntleroy, where the Court found it impermissible for one court 
 186 GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. V(c). 
 187 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2006). 
 188 See id.  California law mandates that all contracts that restrain anyone from par-
ticipating in a trade, profession, or business are void.  Id.  The state law does not sug-
gest specifically that out-of-state judgments upholding non-competes should not be 
enforced.  However, given the strong language of the statute, the California courts 
reasonably could interpret the statute as barring them from restraining citizens from 
working in a trade, profession, or business. 
 189 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 81 n.9 (1982) (“State courts, of 
course, are free to interpret their own constitutions and laws . . . .”). 
 190 See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 236 (1998) (anti-suit injunctions 
constrain parties, but not courts).  Courts have no direct authority outside their juris-
diction, only indirect power to cause parties within their jurisdiction to take extraterri-
torial action.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878); see also supra notes 
107−11 and accompanying text. 
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to second-guess a foreign court’s determination as to the merits of a 
case.191  In denying Full Faith and Credit to an injunction arising out 
of non-compete litigation in another state, a court would be making a 
decision concerning the execution of a foreign judgment, as in 
M’Elmoyle, rather than making a determination of the merits of the 
case.192  Thus, Georgia and California could argue that declining to 
issue an injunction to enforce a non-compete upheld in a sister state 
does not run afoul of Roche or Fauntleroy. 
Under this view of Full Faith and Credit, the expectations of 
both the employer and the employee are upheld.  In Medtronic, one 
judge in a concurring opinion expressed concern that employees 
would relocate to California “to walk away from valid contractual ob-
ligations, claiming California policy as a protective shield.”193  Yet, the 
same might be said of an employer who uses the policy of states that 
uphold non-competes to override California’s policy.  The status-quo 
“race to judgment” benefits neither employers nor employees.  Both 
are locked in an all-or-nothing gamble in which the first to obtain fa-
vorable judgment obtains nationwide relief, while the losing party 
gets nothing at all.  Employers are arguably harmed in this race be-
cause the employee has the advantage.  Only the employee knows 
where she is going, and the employee has the opportunity to choose 
the forum by filing for declaratory relief at the start of litigation.  As 
was seen in Medtronic, only through the use of questionable court-
room tactics can the employer seeking to enforce a non-compete re-
gain the advantage and hope to win the race.194  Thus, there are 
sound policy reasons for limiting the geographic effect of equitable 
decrees in non-compete cases by limiting the reach of Full Faith and 
Credit.  Courts can pay deference due other jurisdictions under res 
 191 See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908); see also Roche v. McDonald, 
275 U.S. 449, 455 (1928). 
 192 See M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 325 (1939). 
 193 Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, 59 P.3d 231, 239 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., 
concurring).  Justice Brown states that California is “not a political safe zone vis-à-vis 
our sister states, such that the mere act of setting foot on California soil somehow re-
leases a person from the legal duties our sister states recognize.”  Id.  Justice Brown 
further argues that the equity conflict problem inherent in the Medtronic case could 
be resolved by California applying its own law to contracts formed within California, 
and out-of-state law when contracts are formed out of state.  Id. at 238.  However, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has upheld determinations by states that use 
their own social policy to make choice of law determinations.  Baker v. Gen. Motors, 
522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).  Thus, California might choose to apply out-of-state law, 
but would not be compelled to do so under Full Faith and Credit. See Nevada v. Hall, 
440 U.S. 410, 421−22 (1979); see also Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident 
Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). 
 194 See Medtronic, 59 P.3d at 233−34. 
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judicata and Full Faith and Credit, while at the same time retaining 
sovereignty to uphold their own law. 
VI. LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAUSES: AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE 
In the portion of her article dealing with non-competes, Profes-
sor Price also asks whether a liquidated damages clause in such an 
agreement, reduced to judgment in one state, must be given Full 
Faith and Credit when sued upon in another state.195  As discussed 
earlier,196 there are valid reasons why we might want to treat legal and 
equitable judgments differently.  In the case of a non-compete, a liq-
uidated damages clause has the advantage of leaving both employer 
and employee with options. 
A liquidated damages clause, if sufficiently large, could have the 
practical effect of making it infeasible for an employee to take a job 
with a competitor.  However, enforcing such a clause differs from en-
forcing a non-compete via injunction in the key respect that an in-
junction directly limits the freedom of the employee to act, and car-
ries the threat of contempt.  With a liquidated damages clause, there 
is no threat of contempt, and the employee retains the option of pay-
ing the damages, perhaps with the assistance of the new employer.  In 
any event, the employer seeking enforcement of a liquidated dam-
ages clause has no fear of being left empty-handed because either the 
agreement is enforced, or the damages are paid. 
Once a court has issued a judgment on a liquidated damages 
clause, there appears to be little basis for an employee to challenge 
that judgment in a subsequent action in a court of parallel jurisdic-
tion.  As in Fauntleroy, a court’s finding of a debt is res judicata and 
must be given Full Faith and Credit in all states; the fact that the con-
tract upon which the debt is based would be invalid in another state is 
insufficient grounds to deny Full Faith and Credit.197  A defendant 
might find some procedural fault by the plaintiff in enforcing the 
money judgment, as was the case in M’Elmoyle.198  However, given the 
well-established enforceability of money judgments under Full Faith 
and Credit, it is doubtful that a court could find a constitutional or 
statutory problem with enforcing an out-of-state judgment on a liqui-
dated damages clause in a non-compete. 
 195 Price, supra note 16, at 834. 
 196 See sources cited supra notes 168−74. 
 197 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908). 
 198 See generally M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 324−28 (1839). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Jurisdictional conflict manifests more frequently when Full Faith 
and Credit is applied to equitable remedies than to legal remedies.  
Equitable remedies are more varied, and impose more direct re-
straints upon the freedom of litigants, than legal remedies.  A court 
might pass on a judgment for money damages from another state 
with little disturbance to its conscience.  Equitable judgments, on the 
other hand, raise issues of policy that place courts in the dilemma of 
having to ignore their own law, or possibly violating the Constitution.  
Non-competes represent an example of the tension between these 
two interests, and also show how the interests can coexist.  It is 
unlikely that the Founders intended Full Faith and Credit to be a 
mechanism whereby states such as Georgia and California could ex-
port their minority policies on non-competes across the nation.  It is 
equally unlikely that the Founders intended Full Faith and Credit to 
be a loophole in state sovereignty, so that the law in the majority of 
states should become the law for the whole land, with no room for 
minority states such as California and Georgia to set their own course.  
Under the flexible standard set forth by the majority in Baker, there is 
no reason to reach such an all-or-nothing conclusion.  The proper 
conclusion is that determinations as to the enforcement of out-of-
state equitable judgments regarding non-competes⎯which raise 
questions about the court’s power and state policy⎯are within the 
“exclusive province” of individual states as described in Baker.  Thus, 
California and Georgia can maintain their employee-friendly state 
policies against non-competes without fear of imposing their policies 
on the rest of the states in the nation. 
 
